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Three variables hypothesized b hlenker (1980) to 
mediate the use of impression management (social value of 
the image, probability of a successful claim, and negative 
sanctions for an unsuccessful claim) were investigated in a 
3 X 2 X 2  factorial design. The measures of inaccurate 
self-report developed by Paulhus (1990$ Self-deception and 
Impression Management Scales) were the dependent variables 
in the study. The three independent variables were 
operationalized by varying the instructions for the 
experiment which were delivered individually to the 
subjects. Subjects were pre-screened and classified with 
respect to self-monitoring (high/low) prior to treatment 
group assignment. Results suggest that increasing the 
social value of a moral image significantly increases 
impression management scores as compared to increasing the 
social value of an honest or unspecified image. High self­
monitors exhibited more variation in impression management 
scores than did low self—monitors suggesting that the high 
self-monitors were more sophisticated in their use of 
impression management tactics. The measurement and 
operationalization of impression management variables are 
discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduct ion
A common link among all psychologists is the need to 
obtain accurate information from the individuals with whom 
they work. For instance, during therapy clinical or '  ̂
counseling psychologists attempt to develop trust 
thereby create a "safe" environment for their d i e  
is hoped that by creating such an environment, the 
will be willing to expose themselves as they actua 
perceive themselves.
Clinical psychologists conducting assessment usu 
recognize the need to establish rapport with the
being tested. Additionally, they assure their clients 
the confidentiality of their test results (Graham, 1987
Again, the psychologists hope that the individual will
Finally, test constructors are generally concerned with 
the accuracy of information gathered from the tests they 
have constructed. Concerns with response bias, 
dissimulation, and social desirability have plagued test 
constructors for decades. Of these three sources of error, 
dissimulation and socially desirability have received the 
most attention (Furnham, 1986).
Frankel-Brunswick (1939) was one of the first to imply
"safe" enough to respond to the tests accurately.
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that inaccurate self-reports can be attributed either to 
responses an individual truly believes about himself or to 
the wil1ful dissimulation by an individual. Research into 
this distinction remains popular even into the present'" 
(Millham & Kellogg, 1980; Paulhus, 1984). In a recent 
article by Paulhus C1984) this distinction was made using 
the concepts of self-deception and impression management.
He argues that these two phenomena make up the socially 
desirable response.
Self-presentation is the label given a set of theories in 
social psychology that addresses the way individuals 
disclose themselves to others (Goffman, 1959). Baumeister 
(1982) dissects such theories into two components: 
self-constructive self-presentation and audience-pleasing 
self-presentation. Baumeister uses the first category to 
describe the self-presentation tactics individuals might use 
to develop and maintain their sense of self. By using self­
presentation tactics, individuals may elicit reactions from 
others to an ideal identity they wish to maintain. In doing 
so they can more readily attribute that identity to 
themselves. Baumeister uses the second category to describe 
the self-presentation tactics individuals might use to gain 
rewards from or influence the audience around them. He 
distinguishes these two processes by suggesting that people 
use self-constructive self-presentation when audience 
demands are minimal. When audience demands are present,
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they may signal a change in the individual's self- 
presentation. He or she may attempt to ascertain the 
audience's expectation of him or herself and present him or 
herself accordingly. This second category has been labeled 
impression management. One difference between this 
formulation of impression management and the formulation by 
researchers in social desirability research is the attention 
paid to audience characteristics. Baumeister (1982) writes:
"The defining characteristics of audience- 
pleasing self-presentation are that it is an 
attempt to present oneself 'favorable' according 
to the audience's values, it is specific to a 
particular audience , and it is motivated by some 
desire for rewards that the audience controls or 
dispenses" (p. 3).
Schlenker (1980) defines impression management as "the
conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are
projected in real or imagined social interact ions" (p. 6).
Describing the function such behavior serves he writes:
"Through public descriptions of the traits they 
possess, the things they are accountable for, and 
the ways they view the world, people can secure 
identities that maximize the public esteem in 
which they are held and the outcomes they receive"
(p. 91).
Recently, impression management theory has made a large 
impact on social psychological research. Baumeister (1982) 
has suggested that experimental subjects' desire to present 
themselves favorably may provide alternative hypotheses for 
several social psychological phenomena. In his article he 
discusses the influence of impression management concerns in
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areas such as the study of altruistic behavior, attitude 
expression and change, attribution, and interpersonal 
attraction. Support for many of Baumeister's assertions can 
be found in the current body of research exploring 
alternative hypotheses derived from impression management 
theory in many of the traditional areas of social 
psychology. However, impression management theory is only 
now beginning to be used to explain phenomena in other areas 
of psychology such as response bias and self-presentation of 
clients in psychotherapy (Paulhus, 1984? Friedlander it 
Schwartz, 1985).
One aspect of impression management theory important to 
the present study is the concept of identity-threatening 
predicaments. These situations occur when the image an 
individual wishes to claim for himself becomes threatened 
(Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi it Reiss, 1981). Under such 
conditions the individual may try to avoid blame or 
disapproval (Friedlander & Schwartz, 1985). The 
significance of this concept to the present study is the 
identity-threatening aspect of accurate self-report 
(Tedeschi it Reiss, 1981). That is, accurate sel f-report is 
bound to include information that is unflattering to the 
individual and perhaps even catastrophic to the desired 
public image the individual wishes to create.
In the interest of obtaining accurate self-reports 
clinical psychologists conducting psychotherapy or
5
assessment attempt to create a safe environment. Test 
constructors attempt to minimize and/or measure inaccurate 
self-report in the tests they construct. The aim of the 
present study is to use the measures of inaccurate 
self-reporting developed by Paulhus (1990) to investigate 
the environmental cues suggested by impression management 
theory that may influence self-report. By this approach a 
few of the variables believed to mediate the use of 
impression management in the interpersonal context will be 
investigated in the context of self-report.
This line of research is consistent with one of the 
suggestions for future research recommended by Furnham 
(1986). He specifically suggests research that investigates 
"under what circumstances socially desirable responses are 
more or less likely to occur" (p. 398). Additionally, 
Friedlander and Schwartz (1985) identify three areas in 
impression management research that need to be addressed. 
They write:
"The major questions posed by self-presentational 
theorists concern (a) why and under what 
conditions people adopt impression management 
tactics, (b) to what extent these social tactics 
are intentional and in awareness, and (c) what 
kinds of identities people project."
Lastly, in a recent literature review of impression
management theory, Leary and Kowalski (1990) call for
research in areas directly related to the present study.
They write:
"The processes involved in self-presentational
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dissimulation have not been adequately 
investigated, and many questions call for future 
research attention. For example, what conditions 
provoke people to act against their values 
regarding deceit and to construct public images 
that are inconsistent with their self-concepts."
The present study is an initial step toward addressing each
of these areas in need of research.
Finally, since Paulhus’ (1984) recognizes both conscious 
and unconscious components of inaccurate self—report, both 
of the constructs he uses (self-deception and impression 
management) will be considered in this investigation. That 
is, by using both of the Paulhus scales it is possible to 
investigate the effects of the experimental manipulations on 
both subject’s conscious and unconscious responses as 
defined by Paulhus. However, before developing specific 
hypotheses, the social desirability and impression 
management concepts relevant to this study will be described 
in detai1.
CHAPTER TWO
Theoretical Background: Review of Social Desirability and
Impression Management Theories
Social Desirability. The socially desirable response is a 
phenomenon that researchers have interpreted in many 
different ways. However, the formulations by Edwards (1957) 
and Crowne and Marlowe (1960) have received the most 
attent ion.
Edwards constructed a scale of 39 MMPI items (The Edwards 
Social Desirability Scale(SD)) that were judged to indicate 
socially desirable responding if answered in the keyed 
direction. This scale generates very similar results to 
scales with different content as long as the items are keyed 
true or false based on a method similar to Edwards' (in 
other words, judges' ratings of items' social desirability). 
Edwards himself said very little about the nature of the 
underlying construct of the SD scale. However, other 
researchers posit that individuals learn to describe 
themselves in socially desirable terms at an early age 
(Walsh, Tomlinson-Keasey, & Klieger, 1974). Their 
interpretation of these results suggests that the socially 
desirable response may be a component of the language 
acquisition process. As such, the socially desirable 
response is out of the individual's awareness and is thereby
7
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distinguished from dissimulation. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with Edwards' writing about the difference 
between impression management and the socially desirable 
response (Edwards, 1970). He distinguishes impression 
management from self-deception by formulating the former as 
conscious dissimulation. For the purposes of this present 
study it should be noted that Edwards' use of the term 
"impression management" is consistent with the its use in 
the social desirability literature, but not with its use in 
the social psychology literature.
Since Edwards' scale was composed of MMPI items dealing 
largely with psychological distress, Crowne and Marlowe 
(1960) argued that the scale was confounded with 
psychopathology. In response to this criticism, they 
developed a social desirability scale that was intended as 
an improved measure of socially desirable responding in 
self-reports (the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale). 
This scale used non-pathological items whose content was 
judged to be either socially desirable but infrequent or 
socially undesirable but common. An individual scoring 
highly on this measure of social desirability has to both 
attribute positive but unlikely characteristics and deny 
negative but likely characteristics about himself.
Following additional research, Crowne and Marlowe (1964) 
later began interpreting the results of their scale as a 
"need for social approval." This interpretation of socially
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desirable responding implied that an individual's response 
set on a paper and pencil test was an expression of a more 
stable personality construct. More specifical1y, Crowne and 
Marlowe proposed two processes that operate within the 
individual to create the socially desirable response. They 
suggested an individual with a high need for approval needed 
to gain approval, an approach motive, and needed to avoid 
disapproval, an avoidance motive. However, this 
formulation was attacked on the grounds that it makes little 
sense to interpret an individual's behavior as 
simultaneously approach- and avoidance- motivated (Jacobson 
& Ford, 1966). In the most recent formulation of this 
concept Crowne (1979) interprets the scale as a need to 
avoid disapproval.
Recently, Paulhus (1984) presented results that he argued 
clarify the nature of the socially desirable response. He 
notes that factor analytic studies of social desirability 
scales tend to support a two factor model. Researchers who 
endorse the Mar1owe-Crowne formulation suggest that these 
factors are related to the attribution and denial components 
of the socially desirable response (Millham & Jacobson 
1978). That is, one factor reflects the subject's tendency 
to attribute positive characteristics to himself and the 
other factor reflects tendencies to deny negative 
characteristics about himself. Paulhus, on the other hand, 
argues that these factors are best interpreted as
self-deception and impression management. He defines 
self-deception as those responses that are probably untrue 
of the individual, yet which the individual honestly 
believes are accurate. He notes that the Edwards scale is a 
marker of the self-deception factor. Tor the impression 
management factor, Paulhus argues the responses are untrue 
of the individual and the person knows they are untrue but 
willfully dissimulates. He proposes that the Crowne-Mar1 owe 
scale confounds the two factors, measuring both 
self-deception and impression management. Paulhus' (1984) 
use of the term impression management is not original, but 
rather is the formulation of impression management in much 
of the social desirability 1iterature (Frankel-Brunswick, 
1939; Edwards, 1957, 1970; Millham Sc Kellogg, 1980).
However, similar to Edwards' formulation of impression 
management, Paulhus conceptualizes impression management as 
willful dissimulation. It is important to note, however, 
that the formulation of impression management in the social 
psychological literature is more complicated, as will be 
seen later.
In a series of studies, Paulhus (1984) cites factor 
analytic and empirical results to support the 
self-deception/impression management distinction. First, he 
administered the Self-deception and Other-deception 
questionnaires (Sackheim 8c Gur, 1978), the Crowne-Marlowe 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne 8c Marlowe, 1960), the
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Edwards Social Desirability Scale (Edwards, 1957), the 
Wiggins Social Desirability Scale (Wiggins, 1959), and the 
MMPI Lie Scale (Meehl & Hathaway, 1946) to 425 subjects. 
Using exploratory factor analytic methods he found that the 
Self-Deception Questionnaire and Edward's Social 
Desirability Scale loaded on one factor while the 
Qther-Deception Questionnaire, the Crowne-Marlowe Scale, the 
Wiggins Social Desirability Scale and the MMPI Lie Scale 
loaded on another. For the first factor he noted that 5 of 
the highest loading 10 items are from the Self-deception 
Questionnaire and the other 5 are from Edwards' Social 
Desirability Scale. Interpreting this factor, he notes that 
it is characterized by items referring to "sexual and 
parental conflicts and other deep personal concerns. These 
kinds of conflicts play a primary role in the psychoanalytic 
conceptions underlying Sackheim and Gur's view of 
self-deception (p. 601)." In other words, the items 
reflected content often associated with unconscious 
c on f1i c t.
For the second factor he reports that the highest loading 
10 items are from the Other-Deception Questionnaire and 
"generally involve socially desirable but relatively 
infrequent behaviors (p. 601)" Furthermore, he suggests 
that these items involve matters for which the truth or 
falsity of the item as it applies to the respondent must be 
known by them. Thus, to endorse these items is to willfully
12
alter the accuracy of the self-report.
In further support of the self-deception/impression 
management distinction, Paulhus (1984) also reports 
confirmatory factor analytic results. In these analyses he 
tested 3 different models to determine which model provided 
the best fit for his data. The models he tested included a 
unidimensional model, the attribution/denial model and the 
self-deception/impression management model.
To facilitate testing these different models he revised 
the Self-Deception Questionnaire and Other— Deception 
Questionnaire to balance the keying in each of the scales. 
Sackheim & Gur's version of the scales used negative keying 
for the Self-Deception Questionnaire and positive keying for 
the Other-Deception Questionnaire. Thus, high 
self-deception scores could be interpreted as denial and 
high other-deception scores could be interpreted as 
attribution. Paulhus balanced the keying so that both 
scales included attribution and denial of the items in each 
scale. He termed these revised scales the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR).
To test the three different models he divided the items of 
the BIDR into 4 separate subscales: self-deception 
attribution, self-deception denial, other deception 
attribution, other deception denial. He then combined these 
subscales across alternate dimensions (attribution/denial 
and self-deception/impression management) with the Crowne-
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Marlowe and Edwards scale to produce the different models. 
Utilizing a chi-square difference test he found that the 
self-deception/impression management model provided a 
significantly better fit for his data than either the 
attribution/denial or unidimensional models.
Finally, Paulhus (1984) utilized an experimental design to 
examine the self-deception/impression management model. He 
randomly assigned subjects to either an anonymous or public 
exposure condition and administered the same battery of 
social desirability scales. He hypothesized that the scales 
that loaded on the impression management factor would show a 
marked increase in the public exposure condition while the 
self-deception scales would remain constant between the two 
conditions. He reasoned that subjects whose responses could 
be identified with them would be more prone to engage in 
impression management. However, since the subjects 
theoretically believed their responses to the self-deception 
questions, the public exposure condition would have no 
effect on these scales. His results supported his 
hypothesis with a significant interaction between treatment 
group and impression management, but not between treatment 
group and self-deception.
Impression Management. Social psychological impression 
management theory is rooted in pragmatic philosophy 
(Schlenker, 1980). A pragmatic approach to psychology 
interprets individuals’ behavior by the function the
14
behavior serves for them. Thus, the identity individuals 
develop is interpreted as that identity which best serves 
them in a particular setting. Consequently, they may 
establish slightly different identities for varying 
situations. For example, an individual may view himself as 
aggressive and independent at home, but establish a passive 
and subservient image while working with his boss 
(Schlenker, 1980). As individuals mature, their responses 
in familiar situations become habitual. It would hardly be 
functional for them to calculate their actions each time 
they re-entered a similar situation. Thus, in many familiar 
situations these "ingrained responses are automatically 
triggered off by the appropriate cues in the situation" 
(Schlenker, 1980 p. 13).
This approach to impression management is based on the 
supposition that such behavior is functional. Theorists in 
impression management suggest that impression management is 
functional in at least two ways (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & 
Reiss, 1981; Baumeister, 1982). First, they suggest 
impression management functions in the process of 
self-definition. If individuals are consistently successful 
at claiming some image, they will soon begin to incorporate 
that image into their own identity. Second, they suggest 
that most of the rewards individuals receive for their 
behavior or identity are controlled by audiences. The 
present study is aimed at the audience-pleasing function of
15
impression management.
Audiences may control tangible rewards such as money or 
non-tangible rewards such as power and acceptance. These 
rewards may be "immediate and pre-planned" (Jones & Pittman, 
1980) or more generally the achievement of "power resources" 
for use in later interactions (Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma, 
1971). According to the above discussion, impression 
management is more likely to occur in situations where 
individuals are dependent on others for rewards. In these 
situations they may alter their behavior to present 
themselves in a way that they perceive the audience will 
view favorably.
In situations where individuals desire to have a 
particular image associated with them, predicaments often 
arise. Predicaments occur when the image an individual has 
claimed or wishes to claim becomes threatened (Schlenker, 
1980). For instance, employees may want their boss to view 
them as efficient and competent. However, inevitably they 
will make mistakes that will jeopardize this image. The 
events or behaviors that will create a predicament are 
related to the impression the individual desires to make.
The specificity of this impression is related to the 
information the individual has about the audience. In 
situations where very little is known about the 
characteristics of the audience, socially approved images 
may be the "safest" bet for the individual.
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Another aspect of impression management that presents a 
dilemma is aptly described by Jones and Pittman (1980).
They write:
"These dilemmas are often cast in moral terms as 
the individual assesses the relative virtues of 
integrity, consistency, and authenticity on the 
one hand, as against the virtues of adaptive 
effectiveness and personal security gained through 
power augmentation on the other" (p. 233).
However, Jones and Wortman (1973) argue that this dilemma is
minimized by adaptive social responding that becomes
automatic when the individual is presented with
well-established cues.
The severity of a predicament is governed by two 
variables. First, the undesirability of the event and 
second, the actor's apparent responsibility for the event. 
For employees, a minor mistake does not constitute a great 
threat to a competent image since it is generally accepted 
that no one is perfect. However, a severe mistake that 
threatens the existence of the company for which they work 
may destroy a competent image. In this latter circumstance, 
the employee may attempt to minimize his or her personal 
responsibility for the mistake (Schlenker, 1980).
Tedeschi and Reiss (1981) propose a framework that 
identifies types of social situations associated with 
specific differential strategies of impression management. 
They describe some situations as identity threatening, which 
may elicit facework (denying or minimizing one's
17
responsibility for an action), or Justification (admitting 
one's responsibility but denying that the consequences are 
negative or inappropriate). They describe other situations 
as identity enhancing. In these situations the actor is 
motivated to create a favorable impression by utilizing 
entitlements (increasing personal responsibility for 
meritorious events). Friedlander & Schwartz (1985) argue 
that the clinical interview can be both identity threatening 
and enhancing, thereby motivating an individual to utilize 
impression management strategies.
To this point the theoretical background and related 
issues associated with impression management have been 
described. Attention is now turned to how an individual 
arrives at claiming one image over another. Schlenker 
(1980) suggests very specific criteria that operate in this 
process. First, he suggests that different images have 
different values for the individual. He describes the 
process by which these values are assessed as "accounting 
procedures." These procedures can be described 
mathematically based on an expectancy-value formulation. To 
determine the value of an image he proposes two variables 
that are multiplied and summed to arrive at the expected 
value of an image. The first variable is "the strength of 
the person's belief that certain consequences (benefits and 
liabilities) will be associated with the image" (p. 96).
The second variable is "the person's evaluation of each of
18
these consequences" (p. 96). The formula for the expected 
value of an image is then expressed as: I = E (b̂  x ê )
where I is the expected value of the image, b is the 
individual's beliefs about the consequences of claiming the 
image, and e is the individual's evaluation of these 
consequences.
Similarly, Schlenker (1980) suggests that the expected 
value of claiming an image can also be computed. The 
formula for the expected value of claiming an image is:
IC = p(I) + (l-p)S "where IC is the expected value for 
claiming the image, p is the probability that the individual 
can successfully claim the image, I is the expected value of 
the image, and S is the expected value of negative sanctions 
associated with an unsuccessful claim. S can be expressed 
as: S = £ (psj) (esj) where ps^ is the probability that a
particular sanction will occur and esj is the value of the 
sanct ion."
These criteria for determining the likelihood that an 
individual will engage in impression management suggest that 
the audience can alter the impression an actor will claim. 
That is, the audience can change the expected value of some 
image, the criteria necessary for claiming that image, and 
the negative sanctions for unsuccessfully claiming the 
image. By changing these conditions, the audience may exert 
considerable influence over the behavior of the actor. A 
review of Paulhus' (1984) theoretical framework for the
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Impression Management Scale in terms of Schlenker's (1980) 
accounting procedures will help to clarify this point.
The concepts of impression management described above 
suggest alternative interpretations of Paulhus' (1984) 
results regarding 1) the meaning of high scores on the 
scale he uses to measure impression management, and 2) 
change in impression management scores in his public 
exposure condition. Each of these will be examined in turn.
Impression management theory holds that the impression an 
individual wishes to create is audience dependent. That is, 
the image individuals project may vary depending on the 
their perception of what the audience will view as favorable 
(Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981; Baumeister, 1982). 
Paulhus (1984) assumes that impression management is an 
individual's attempt to create a favorable impression, but 
he never specifies the nature of this impression. Appendix 
A contains the 20 items that Paulhus asserts measure 
impression management. The face validity of these items may 
indicate that the favorable impression Paulhus is measuring 
is one of moral integrity. For instance, the first item of 
his scale reads "I sometimes tell lies if I have to," and 
the sixth item is "I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely 
to get caught." In many situations and for many individuals 
the impression they may wish to have attributed to them 
might be one of moral integrity. However, there are many 
other impressions that an individual may wish to create,
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depending on his or her perception of the audience 
expectations, e.g., creative, uninhibited, confident 
(Johnson, 1981).
This alternative interpretation of the impression 
management scale is easily illustrated with the accounting 
procedures outlined above. The value of a moral integrity 
image depends on the perceived consequences of claiming that 
image and the evaluation of the consequences. Additionally, 
the expected value of claiming an image of moral integrity 
depends on the estimated probability of a successful claim 
and the negative sanctions for an unsuccessful claim.
Recall that Paulhus* scale for impression management is 
composed of items whose keyed response indicates socially 
desirable but infrequent behavior. Thus, for individuals to 
create an image of moral integrity, they are likely to need 
to dissimulate in their report. This constitutes an 
impression management predicament. A particular image is 
valued, yet the valued image is threatened by unsuccessful 
dissimulation. In fact, unsuccessful dissimulation may 
create an image opposite to the valued image. In this 
situation an alternative impression may be claimed. If an 
individual judges the value of an honest image to be greater 
than an image of moral integrity, he may be willing to 
endorse socially undesirable items in order to create this 
■image. Such a response would solve the impression 
management predicament if the audience was judged to
21
appreciate honesty at least as much as moral integrity.
If Paulhus’ measure of impression management is 
sensitive to only one specific impression (moral integrity), 
then scores on his scale may not reflect individual 
differences in impression management. Rather, scores on his 
impression management scale may be measuring type rather 
than degree of impression management. Therefore, if 
Paulhus’ public/private experimental manipulation was such 
that subjects perceived an impression of moral integrity 
might be evaluated favorably, they may have been prone to 
adopt a moral impression when faced with public exposure. 
However, they would have done so only to the extent that 
they believed a moral impression was valued and only to the 
extent that they believed their dissimulation could not be 
detected. Support for this assertion can be found in 
research that uses the "bogus pipeline" methodology (Jones & 
Sigall, 1971). Using this research methodology, 
experimenters convince their subjects that they have a 
physiological measurement device that can reliably and 
validly assess the truth or falsity of their responses.
Under theses conditions, scores for impression management 
have shown a statistically significant decrease (Millham & 
Kellogg, 1980). In terms of Schlenker’s (1980) accounting 
procedures, in the bogus pipeline scenario the valued 
impression is one of honesty, and the probability of a 
successfully claimed dissimulated image approaches 0.
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The second aspect of Paulhus' study that may be 
reinterpreted with impression management concepts concerns 
his use of the public versus anonymous conditions to test 
the impression management factor. This approach assumes 
that the tendency to use impression management tactics is 
equal to the degree of change between these two conditions. 
However, other research using this methodology suggests that 
the identity of the observer in the public condition can 
affect motivation to use impression management (e.g., 
Christensen, 1981; Baumeister, 1982). Some subjects may be 
relatively unmotivated to utilize impression management 
tactics for public exposure, but faced with parental 
exposure or teacher exposure would be far more motivated to 
assume some impression (Schlenker, 1980).
In the Paulhus' study (Paulhus, 1984) the public condition 
was operationalized by asking subjects to put their name, 
address, and phone number on the cover sheet. They were 
then told that "the experimenter would be reading through 
their answers to 'ensure that they had read the questions 
carefully'" (p. 605). Finally, the subjects "were asked to 
give their completed inventories directly to the 
experimenter 'so that we will be able to recognize you 
later'" (p. 605). Given this operationalization, it seems 
likely that what is being measured may not be a general 
propensity toward the use of impression management tactics, 
but rather individual differences in sensitivity to the
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experimenter's peering eye. Perhaps stated more accurately, 
this sensitivity represents individual differences in the 
evaluation of negative sanctions for not claiming an image 
of moral integrity for the experimenter.
The above discussion of Paulhus' study and impression 
management suggests another issue to be addressed. What are 
the specific factors that motivate subjects to create a 
favorable image for the experimenter? Reviewing the 
literature of subject motives, Christensen (1981) has 
identified a number of variables that affect subjects' 
motivation to create a favorable image. Among these are the 
observers' likeableness and status, power differentials 
between subject and observer, and freedom of response that 
indicates the subjects' actions are a function of their own 
volition. These are variables that potentially affect many 
experiments relying on self-report data, thereby implicating 
impression management in much of the data collected.
(Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981)
Is impression management or socially desirable responding 
in self-report within the subject's awareness or not? Or, 
as Paulhus (1984) argues, is it both? This is a question 
that continues to be debated in both the impression 
management and social desirability 1iterature (e.g., 
Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981; Paulhus, 1984). 
Paulhus describes self-deception as beliefs an individual 
has about himself that are probably not accurate. He
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distinguishes between self-deceptive responding and 
dissimulation by the individual’s genuine belief that his 
responses are accurate. This view of self-deception is 
supported by research that finds consistency in responses to 
self-deception scales across varying experimental 
cond it ions.
Additionally, Millham and Kellogg (1980) operationalized 
self-deception as their subjects’ social desirability scores 
under the bogus pipeline condition. These authors reasoned 
that socially desirable responses under these conditions 
reflect genuine beliefs about the self, because 
dissimulation "could be detected" and is therefore, 
presumably minimized.
Schlenker (1980) argues that impression management which 
is outside of the individual’s awareness may function to 
manage the self-concept. He cites evidence that recall of 
information is enhanced for information consistent with the 
self-concept (Markus, 1977). This notion is also supported 
by Millham and Kellogg (1980). They found that subjects who 
scored high on self-deception were able to recall less 
information from a negative evaluation than subjects who 
scored low on self-deception. Additionally, high 
self-deceivers were able to recall significantly more 
information from positive evaluation than negative.
According to these views of self-deception, scores on a 
self-deception scale should remain consistent under
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conditions that are either very favorable or unfavorable for 
impression management. However, if they vary across 
conditions that affect impression management, then a 
completely unconscious formulation of self-deception will be 
suspect. Additionally, such results would certainly blur 
the impression management/self-deception distinction 
proposed by Paulhus (1984).
Self-monitorino. Finally, the issue of individual 
differences in impression management must be addressed.
With respect to individual differences, most of the 
impression management and social desirability literature 
agrees that there are individual differences in the tendency 
to use impression management tactics or give socially 
desirable responses. One variable that appears to mediate 
impression management is self-monitoring. This variable has 
been related not only to the ability to adjust behavior to 
the social situation, but also to the ability to perceive 
the reactions of others to one's behavior (Tobey & Tunnel 1, 
1981; Schlenker, Miller, & Leary, 1983). The Self-monitoring 
Questionnaire -Revised (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985) is the 
scale often used as a criterion variable in these studies.
CHAPTER THREE
Rationale For Present Study
Conditions that may affect the accuracy of self-report and 
methods for measuring inaccuracies in self-report have been 
reviewed to this point. A recent formulation and 
measurement strategy in the social desirability 1iterature, 
the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 
1990), is argued to measure separate constructs of 
self-deception and impression management. However, in this 
presentation it has been argued that alternative hypotheses 
derived from the impression management 1iterature may lead 
to other interpretations of this scale. It is on the basis 
of these alternative hypotheses that the use of the BIDR as 
a dependent measure in the present study is proposed. The 
rationale for its use will be developed within the 
accounting procedures framework of Schlenker (1980).
The first variable in Schlenker's accounting procedures is 
the value of the impression. It was argued that if the 
experimenter is perceived as one who would look on moral 
integrity favorably, then the probability that the subject 
will claim a moral integrity impression increases. Thus, 
if the cues of the experimental setting motivate subjects to 
claim an image of moral integrity, then they will score 
higher on the Impression Management Scale. However, recall
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that high scores on this scale also reflect dissimulation.
It was argued that this construction creates a dilemma 
between the socially approved moral integrity image and an 
image of honesty. If an individual expects that an image of 
honesty is more valuable than a moral integrity image, then 
his or her scores on the Impression Management Scale will be 
lower. Eysenck, Eysenck, and Shaw (1974) found that special 
"honest" instructions significantly decreased MMPI Lie Scale 
scores. Although honesty is also a socially approved 
attribute, the dilemma present in the Impression Management 
Scale forces the respondent to choose non-social1y approved 
responses in order to claim an honest image.
In a sense, without environmental cues to help respondents
solve the above dilemma, they are left to guess at the
valued impression or give automatic responses. However, the
fact that the Impression Management Scale is generally
completed in the context of an experiment provides the them
with some clues. In 1934 Vernon wrote:
"The subject's answers are doubtless dictated, in 
part, not only by his notions as to what the test 
is meant to measure (notions which may be more or 
less incorrect), but also by his relations to the 
people who are going to see these answers" (p.
1 6 6) .
The first experimental condition proposed for the present 
study is designed to assist respondents in solving the moral 
integrity/honesty dilemma inherent in the BIDR. By varying 
the stated purpose of the experiment, cues to the valued
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impression will be provided to the subjects. Three levels 
of this condition are proposed. The first level will 
provide cues that increase the value of a moral integrity 
image. The second level will provide cues that increase the
value of an honest image. The third level will not
explicitly provide any cues, thus comprising a control 
level. The stated purpose of the study in this level will
be form effects in measurement of psychological variables.
The second variable in Schlenker’s accounting procedures 
is respondents' estimation of the probability that they can 
successfully claim the desired image. The bogus pipeline 
procedure functions to minimize the evaluated probability of 
claiming any image but that of honesty. In the present 
study a more naturalistic employment of the bogus pipeline 
will be used for the second experimental condition.
Subjects will be informed that two different measures of 
honesty, moral integrity, or an unspecified construct, will 
be employed. They will be informed that they will first 
complete a paper and pencil measure and then a specialized 
version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. The Rorschach will 
be presented as an alternative, indirect measure of the 
stated experimental variable. This condition will have two 
levels. Either subjects will be told the Rorschach will be 
administered or they will not be told this. To the extent 
that the Rorschach is accepted as a credible measure that is 
impervious to faking, the subjects' estimated probability of
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successful dissimulation should decrease.
The third variable of Schlenkerfs accounting procedures is 
the perceived sanctions for the unsuccessful claim of an 
image. Studies such as Paulhus’ that use public versus 
private conditions assume that the subjects’ evaluation of 
sanctions is generally greater in the public condition. 
Although this may be true, the reliability of this 
manipulation across subjects may be doubtful. It is 
therefore proposed in this study that a more universal 
manipulation of negative sanctions is the threat of being 
confronted with inconsistency of responding.
In the third experimental condition, the first level 
consists of telling subjects that the results of two 
different measures will be compared and any noted 
discrepancies will be explored with them in a brief 
interview. In the second level subjects will be told that 
when they have finished completing the tests they will be 
done with the experiment.
The Self-Monitoring Scale- Revised (Gangestad & Snyder, 
1985) will be used as a between subjects variable in the 
present study. Past research indicates this variable is 
useful for measuring propensity toward impression 
management. Thus, by using this variable, specific 
hypotheses can be made concerning high versus low self­
monitoring individuals.
Finally, Paulhus C1990) reports that males tend to score
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higher on the Impression Management Scale and lower on the 
Self-Deception Scale than females. However, consistent sex 
differences in the use of impression management strategies 
relevant to this study have not been reported. Sex 
differences in impression management and self-deception 
scores can be controlled by balancing sex distributions in 
the experimental conditions. Therefore, sex will not be a 
between subjects variable in the present study.
Hypotheses. Since impression management and self- 
deception are theoretically distinct constructs, separate 
hypotheses are stated for each. Additionally, because the 
experimental conditions of this study are
operationalizations of the variables in Schlenker’s (1980) 
accounting procedures, hypotheses for this study are derived 
directly from the predictions made by these procedures. 
Hypotheses concerning impression management scores will be 
addressed first.
Significant differences in impression management scores 
are predicted for 1) each of the stated purposes of the 
study, 2) the Rorschach versus no Rorschach condition, and 
3) the discrepancies versus no discrepancies conditions.
The variation in the stated purpose of the study is expected 
to change the perceived value of honest versus moral 
impressions. The application of the Rorschach instructions 
is expected to reduce dissimulation and hence impression 
management scores by reducing subjects’ estimated
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probabilities for successful dissimulation. The application 
of the discrepancies instructions is expected to increase 
the perceived cost of dissimulation, thereby also reducing 
impression management scores.
The probability of successfully claiming an image and the 
negative sanctions for an unsuccessful claim are expressed 
as a multiplicative function in Schlenker’s (1980) 
accounting procedures. Therefore, when the Rorschach 
condition is combined with the discrepancies condition, an 
interfering interaction on impression management scores is 
hypothesized.
Since high self-monitors reportedly show a greater 
propensity toward impression management, a significant 
difference between high and low self-monitors on impression 
management is hypothesized. Additionally, since past 
research indicates that high self-monitors pay more 
attention to environmental cues than low self-monitors, it 
is hypothesized that the stated purpose of the study 
condition will have a greater effect for high rather than 
low self-monitors. Since self-monitoring has been used only 
as a measure of general propensity toward impression 
management, no further predictions with respect to this 
variable and experimental conditions can be made. However, 
other interactions between self-monitoring and experimental 
condition may help to further clarify the differences 
between high and low self-monitors with respect to
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impression management.
In keeping with the wealth of research on self-deception, 
no significant differences are predicted for the 
Self-Deception Scale scores. However, in the event that 
self-deception scores do change a subsidiary hypothesis is 
that they will follow the same patterns as have been 
described for impression management scores in the second two 
experimental conditions (Rorschach, discrepancies).
Finally, it is hypothesized that treatment condition will 
affect the strength of endorsement for some items. Such a 
phenomenon is likely to occur in this study because the 
variation in negative social value of the items on the 
Impression Management and Self-Deception Scales will likely 
interact with treatment condition. Such a phenomena is 
worth investigation for two reasons, 1) it suggests that 
subjects could alter the items they endorse without altering 
their total score, and 2) this effect might be 
systematically related to treatment condition.
CHAPTER FOUR
Methods
Subjects
Seventy-two male and 72 female undergraduate students 
enrolled in introductory psychology and social work courses 
at the University of Montana participated as subjects in the 
present study. The subjects earned experimental credit to 
fulfill general course requirements in return for their 
part ic ipat ion.
Apparatus
The dependent measure for the present study was the 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus,
1990)(Appendix A). This inventory consists of two 
subscales: the Impression Management (IM) Scale and the 
Self-Deception (SD) Scale. Each subscale consists of 20 
items that are responded to on a variation of the 
seven-point Likert Scale. The anchor points for responses 
are "not true", "neutral", and "very true" corresponding to 
scale scores of 1, 4, and 7 respectively. Additionally, the 
scoring key for each subscale is balanced.
Paulhus (1990) reported a range of reliability 
coefficients for each of the two subscales. For the 
Impression Management subscale he reported coefficient 
alphas in the range of .75 to .88. For the Self-deception
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subscale he reported coefficient alphas in the range of .68 
to .80.
With respect to convergent validity, Paulhus (1984; 1990) 
reported substantial correlations between the Impression 
Management Scale and traditional lie scales such as the MMPI 
Lie Scale and Eysenk's Lie Scale. He also reported 
substantial correlations with role-playing scales, such as 
Wiggins Sd (Social Desirability) and Gough7s Gi (Good 
Impression). Unfortunately, Paulhus (1990) did not present 
specific validity coefficients for the most recent revision 
of the GIDR. For the Self-Deception Scale Paulhus (1990) 
reported positive correlations with several measures of 
defensiveness and coping. These include Byrne's R-S Scale 
(r_ = .51), Ihilevich and Gleser's (1986) Defense Mechanisms 
Inventory (r_ = .34), and the positive re-appraisal (r_ =
.44), the distancing (r_ = .33), and the self-controlling (r. 
= .39) subscales of the Ways of Coping Scale (Sabourin, 
Bourgeois, Gendreau, 8c Morval, in press).
Finally, Paulhus (1990) presented data to support the 
discriminant validity of the Impression Management Scale and 
the Self-deception scale. His own research with this most 
recent version of these scales has resulted in correlations 
ranging from .05 to .40 between the Impression Management 
and Self-Deception Scale.
The Self-Monitoring Scale-Revised (SMS-R) (Gangestad 8< 
Snyder, 1985) is composed of 18 items in a true false format
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(Appendix B). Eight of the 18 items are keyed true and the 
rest are keyed false. For this shortened revised version, 
Snyder and Gangestad (1986) reported a coefficient alpha of 
.70. Convergent validity is evidenced by a correlation of 
.72 between the SMS-R and an alternative measure of self­
monitoring suggested by Lennox and Wolfe (1984). Gangestad 
and Snyder (1985) reported that a cut-off score of 11 or 
greater corresponds to a .5 probability that the subject is 
a high self-monitor. Conversely, a score less than 11 
corresponds to a .5 probability that the subject is a low 
self-monitor. They reported that using classification 
methodologies similar to this, they achieved an 89% correct 
classification rate. They also reported that for their 
population of college students (n = 1914), approximately 60 
percent were low self-monitors and the remaining 40 percent
I
were high self-monitors.
The multiple choice version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test 
(Harrower-Erikson, 1943) provides the subject with three 
groups of ten possible percepts for each inkblot. Subjects 
are asked to look carefully at each inkblot and then select 
one percept in each of the three groups. When they have 
done this they are told they may also put a check next to 
any other percepts that they also think is a good descriptor 
of the blot. Responses in each group include 5 percepts 
that are considered normal and 5 that are considered 
abnormal. Since the data gathered from this test were not
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central to the research questionf only cards I, II, VI, and 
VIII were administered. The instructions and answer sheets 
for the 4 cards that were used are included in Appendix C. 
Procedure
In order to classify subjects as high or low self­
monitors, 350 subjects initially participated in a screening 
session where they completed the SliS-R and other 
questionnaires from an unrelated study. This initial 
screening did not identify enough high self-monitors and 
consequently, 60 subjects from an introductory social work 
class were also screened. These subjects participated 
voluntarily. All subjects were randomly assigned to 
treatment group by self-monitoring classification <high/low> 
while sex of subjects was balanced within each group. Once 
assigned to treatment condition, subjects were contacted by 
telephone to schedule a time for participating in the study.
Subjects arrived individually for their scheduled 
appointments. The experimenter, who was blind with respect 
to the self-monitoring classification of subjects, escorted 
them to a small room furnished with only a table and two 
chairs. He then began by thanking the subject for 
participating in the study and then immediately delivered 
the set of instructions for the experimental condition 
previously assigned to the subject. To assure continuity 
between experimental conditions and across subjects, both 
the introductory remarks and instructions were delivered
from a script memorized by the experimenter (Appendix D) 
Since each of the 12 experimental conditions required 
slightly different scripts, the script for each of the 1 
conditions is presented in Appendix E. As an example, t 
script for the moral integrity X Rorschach X discrepanci 
presentation was as follows:
This is a study about morality. Morality is 
that characteristic of people which influences 
them to do what is right or good in many 
situations. Many psychologists believe that the 
morality of people in our society is 
deteriorating. But I don’t believe that is true 
because their conclusions are based on what 1 
believe is a poor approach to the measurement of 
morality. I am trying to measure morality in two 
different ways. The first way is with a 
questionnaire which is very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed. The 
other way is with a specialized version of the 
Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is the test 
psychologists are using when they ask people to 
look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. 
It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure 
personality. For instance, psychologists who work 
with prison inmates use it because inmates 
sometimes try to lie about what they are really 
like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists 
get accurate information about the inmates.
I will give you the questionnaire about morality 
first. When you are finished with it, I will give 
you the specialized version of the Rorschach 
Inkblot Test. After you have finished both tests 
I will compare the results from these two test.
If their are discrepancies between your results on 
these two tests, I would like to talk with you 
about your answers on the questionnaire, so that I 
can understand why there are differences between 
your scores on the two different tests.
Now that you have learned the nature of this 
study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw 
from participating if you want to. Do you still 
want to participate? (PAUSE)
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Once the experimenter had delivered the appropriate 
instructions, he gave the subjects the BIDR. Since order 
effects between the IM Scale and the SD Scale have not been 
noted in previous studies, the IM Scale was always the first 
scale administered in the BIDR. Half the subjects then 
completed the multiple choice version of the Rorschach 
Inkblot Test. After all of the questionnaires were 
completed, subjects were given the experimental manipulation 
questionnaire. This questionnaire assessed the 
effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, subjects’ 
expectancies before and during the study, and subjects’ 
previous experience with the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This 
questionnaire along with administration instructions is 
included in Appendix F.
At the conclusion of the study subjects were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. The debriefing included an 
explanation of all deceptive components of the study and the 
purpose for the deception. Debriefing instructions are 
included in Appendix G.
It was hypothesized that treatment condition would affect 
the strength of endorsement for some items. To test this 
hypothesis an additional group of 98 subjects was recruited 
to determine the social desirability scale value for each of 
the BIDR items. The methodology suggested by Edwards 
(1970) was used to derive these social desirability scale 
values (SDSV). First, the 40 items in the BIDR were
re-written in the third person. Then instructions and 
nine-point Likert Scale were added to the BIDR. This 
altered version of the BIDR which was administered in 
group administration is included in appendix H.
CHAPTER FIVE
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Results
The data from this study were coded and entered 
independently by the experimenter and a research assistant. 
The data were cross-checked for discrepancies which were 
then corrected. Missing data was extremely infrequent, but 
to allow equal n_ analysis the mean of a missing item was 
inserted in 12 cases across three different items.
The major dependent variables in this study were 
Impression Management and Self-Deception. The four 
independent variables were between-subjects variables: 
stated purpose (morality, honesty, control), Rorschach 
(described, not described), discrepancies (described, not 
described), and self-monitoring (high, low). Sex of 
subjects was balanced across all four independent variables 
but was not analyzed. For each dependent variable, the 
omnibus null hypothesis was tested first. Then the full 2 X 
3 X 2 X 2  ahova model was analyzed and multiple comparisons 
computed with the Newman-Keuls procedure at the .05 level of 
signi ficance.
The quality of Rorschach responses (good, poor) was 
analyzed by means of chi-squared on each of the independent 
variables of stated purpose, discrepancies, and 
self-monitoring.
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Item endorsement by treatment condition was analyzed by 
first regressing each individual's responses onto the social 
desirability scale value of each item. The residuals from 
this analysis were used to first test the omnibus null 
hypothesis for each item. Those items for which the results 
failed to reject the omnibus null hypothesis were then 
eliminated from further analysis. The remaining items were 
then tested with the full 2 X 3 X 2 X 2 anova model. 
Validation of Manipulations
As an initial step in examining the validity of the 
experimental manipulations, medians were computed for each 
of the questions on the experimental manipulation 
questionnaire. For all questions related to whether or not 
the subjects believed the stated purpose of the study and 
the assertions of the experimenterf the median responses 
ranged from 2.5 to 4.0 or from "somewhat" to "completely.” 
For subjects who received the Rorschach instructions, the 
median Judgment of its ability to accurately measure the 
stated purpose of the study was 0.0 or "uncertain" for allI
three stated purposes. For subjects who received the 
discrepancies instructions, the median response about their 
concern with having to discuss discrepancies was 0.0 or 
"uncertain" for each of the stated purposes.
Of the subjects exposed to the Rorschach instructions, 12 
percent had previous experience with the Rorschach in each 
of the honesty and control groups. However, 25 percent of
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the subjects in the morality group had previous experience 
with the Rorschach.
Following these initial analyses, the experimental 
manipulation questions were analyzed individually with the 
either a one-way or the full model anova. From these 
analyses only a few significant effects were discovered.
For the first question concerning how much subjects believed 
the stated purpose of the study during the instructions, the 
only significant effect was for the Rorschach condition 
F<1,120) = 6.09, ql<.05. Subjects found the study less 
believable when instructions for the Rorschach were given 
(X = 2.96) than when they were not <X = 3.44). For the 
second question concerning how much subjects believed the 
integrity of the study as they completed the questionnaire, 
a significant four-way interaction (Figure 1) emerged 
F<2,120) = 3.74, g<.05. To simplify somewhat, experimental 
condition had less impact on the belief ratings of low self­
monitors than on the belief ratings of high self-monitors. 
Specifically, high self-monitors tended to have less 
confidence in the control conditions than they had in the 
other conditions.
Impression Management
The test of the omnibus null hypothesis for impression 
management across all treatment conditions was significant 
F<11,132) = 2.22, g<05. The hypotheses concerning the 
stated purpose of the study were partially supported for
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Figure 1. Four-way interaction of subjects' rated belief 
about the integrity of the study as they filled out the 
questionnaire on treatment condition.
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impression management in that the main effect for the stated 
purpose of the study was significant FC2,120) = 6.40, g<.01. 
However, the Newman-Keuls multiple comparison procedure 
revealed significant differences only between the morality 
condition (X = 84.94) and the honesty (X = 74.23) and 
control <X = 73.98) conditions. That is, the honesty and 
control conditions did not differ significantly from each 
other. The hypotheses concerning the differences between 
the Rorschach and discrepancies conditions were not 
supported.
The hypothesis of an interaction between the Rorschach and 
discrepancies conditions to reflect the multiplicative 
relationship between Schlenker's (1980) probability of a 
successful claim and negative sanctions constructs was not 
supported. However, a three-factor interaction for the 
stated purpose, Rorschach, and discrepancies conditions 
approached significance F(2,120) = 2.59, g. = .079, which is 
suggestive of a trend in responding based on the interaction 
of all three variables (Figure 2). There were substantial 
differences between the morality - no Rorschach - no 
discrepancies condition (X = 93.75) and four other 
conditions: the form effects - Rorschach - discrepancies
condition (X = 68.42), the honesty - Rorschach - no 
discrepancies condition (X = 68.00), the honesty - no 
rorschach - no discrepancies condition (X = 70.75), and the 
form effects - no Rorschach - no discrepancies condition (X
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= 68.58). This pattern of differences suggests that the 
subjects* interpretation and consequent response to each of 
the independent variables was somewhat dependent on the 
configuration of their particular treatment condition. That 
is, impression management scores were significantly higher 
for the stated purpose of morality than the stated purpose 
of honesty only when the morality manipulation was by itself 
and the honesty manipulation was not paired with the 
discrepancies manipulation. The control manipulation was 
significantly different from the morality alone condition 
only when both the Rorschach and discrepancies manipulat ions 
were paired with it or were both absent.
Discrepancies No Discrepancies
90 *
Rorschach
80 *
70 ■
No
Rorschach60 ■
Morality Honesty Control
90 *
No
Rorschach
80 ■
70 ■
Rorschach
Morality Honesty Control
Figure 2. The interaction of stated purpose by Rorschach by 
discrepancies for impression management <p = .079).
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The hypothesis of differences in impression management 
between high and low self-monitors was supported. However, 
the hypothesis of a significant interaction between 
self-monitoring and the stated purpose of the study was not. 
Instead, a significant interaction between self-monitoring 
and discrepancies emerged F(1,120) = 4.15, gK.05 (Figure 3). 
High self-monitors scored significantly lower (X = 69.47) 
than low self-monitors (X = 84.80) on impression management 
in the no discrepancies condition but not in the 
discrepancies condition.
Low Self- 
Monitors
90 «
70 ■ High
Self-Monitors
60
Discrepancies Mo
Discrepancies
Figure 3. The interaction of discrepancies by self­
monitoring for impression management
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Self-Deceot ion
The test of the omnibus null hypothesis for self-deception 
across all treatment conditions was not significant 
F(ll,132) = 1.41, = .17. Exploratory analyses of trends
in the data were inconclusive.
Total Score
Finally, since Paulhus C1990) reported that the total 
score derived from the summation of the impression 
management and self-deception scores correlates highly with 
other measures of social desirability (i.e., .71 with the 
Mar1owe-Crowne Scale) a post hoc analysis of the full anova 
model on the total BIDR scores was conducted. The test of 
the omnibus null hypothesis for this analysis was 
significant F(11,132) - 2.52, g<.05, and two interactions 
were shown to be significant.
The three-factor interaction between the stated purpose, 
Rorschach, and discrepancies conditions was significant 
F<2,120) = 3.46, e<-05. This pattern of results was very 
similar to that of the Impression Management Scale alone.
The mean of the morality - no Rorschach - no discrepancies 
condition (X = 188.67) was significantly higher than the 
means of four other conditions: the form effects -
Rorschach - discrepancies condition (X = 152.00), the 
honesty - Rorschach - no discrepancies condition (X = 
152.67), the honesty - no Rorschach - no discrepancies 
condition (X = 151.33), and the form effects - no Rorschach
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- no discrepancies condition ("Z = 150.17).
Finally, the analysis on total score revealed a 
significant interaction between self-monitoring and 
discrepancies with a pattern of results nearly identical to 
the results for the Impression Management Scale alone 
F(l,120) = 8.61, gK.01. High self-monitors not faced with 
discrepancies scored significantly higher (X = 150.69) than 
low self-monitors in the same condition (X = 172.25). The 
high-low difference was not significant in the no 
discrepancies condition.
Item Analysis
Only four items were retained following the omnibus test 
of the null hypothesis for each of the 40 items on the IM 
and SD scales. The data for this analysis were the 
residuals that remained after the social desirability was 
regressed out of each individual7s scores. Consequently, a 
significant difference reflects that the item was 
consistently endorsed either more or less strongly than each 
individual's personal conception of what was socially 
desirable. Since the IM and SD scales are intended to 
measure social desirability, significant differences among 
the items is interpreted as the use of significantly more or 
less social desirability with respect to most other items on 
the scale.
The only item from the IM scale to reach significance (F 
C11,132)= 2.11, q <.05) reads “I have done things that I
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don't tell other people about." In 11 of 12 treatment 
groups, subjects responded to this item with less social 
desirability than they used in responding to most other 
items. All three items from the SD scale that reached 
significance were responded to with more social desirability 
than was used in answering most items. These items read 
"Once I have made up my mind, people can seldom change my 
opinion" (F (11,132) * 2.24, e<.05), "I have sometimes 
doubted my ability as a sex partner" (F. (11,132) = 2.39, 
fK.Ol), and "It's alright with me if some people happen to 
dislike me", (F (11,132) = 2.45, g<.01).
Rorschach
Responses from the Rorschach were coded as good or poor 
responses and the number of good and poor responses summed 
for each independent variable of the study. This resulted 
in a three X two contingency table for each independent 
variable. A chi-square statistic was computed to determine 
whether the number of good or poor responses was related to 
treatment condition.
For the stated hypothesis the chi-square statistic was not 
significant. However, the pattern of poor responses was 
consistent with the hypothesis. Subjects in the honesty 
condition gave 236 good responses and 52 poor responses, 
while subjects in the morality and control conditions gave 
247 good and 41 poor and 246 good and 42 poor responses 
respectively. No significant differences or meaningful
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patterns were found for either the discrepancies condition 
or between self-monitoring groups.
CHAPTER SIX
Discussion
The results from the experimental manipulations 
questionnaire suggest that overall subjects believed the 
purpose and conditions of the study as it was described to 
them. The Rorschach condition was slightly less believable 
than was expected, which probably limited its effectiveness 
in this study. Additionally, the high self-monitoring 
subjects tended to have less confidence in the control 
condition as they were completing the questionnaire. This 
was probably due to their lack of understanding of the 
stated purpose of this condition combined with their greater 
sensitivity to impression management cues. It is not 
difficult to imagine subjects feeling less confident about a 
stated purpose they did not fully understand.
The percentage of subjects who had previous experience 
with the Rorschach was unexpected. However, since the 
Rorschach was introduced as a "specialized version," prior 
experience may not have precluded its effectiveness.
The significant effects of the discrepancies condition on 
impression management and total BIDR score are interesting 
in light of the relatively low ratings subjects gave to 
their concern about discussing discrepancies. However, it 
is probably not socially desirable to admit being concerned
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about discussing one's answers. This may be true because 
honesty and consistency are valued in our culture, and 
discussing answers is only threatening if these two 
conditions are not met. Therefore, to admit concern is to 
admit either dishonesty or inconsistency.
Finally, the significant four-factor interaction on the 
second question concerning how much subjects believed the 
integrity of the study as they completed the questionnaire 
may be useful for interpreting results, but does not 
invalidate the operationalization of the independent 
variables for two reasons. First, the reliability of a 
single item makes the stability of these results somewhat 
questionable. Additionally, the variability in treatment 
group means for how much subjects believed the stated 
purpose of the study as they were filling out the 
questionnaires does not include values indicating disbelief 
or suspicion.
Impression Management
The main effect for the stated purpose of the study on 
impression management was significant, as predicted, and the 
mean for the morality condition was significantly higher 
than the honesty and control conditions, also as predicted. 
Thus, it appears that the stated purpose of morality 
successfully raised the social value of a moral impression 
thereby influencing the scores of individuals in that 
treatment group. These findings support the assertion that
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Paulhus* (1990) Impression Management Scale is sensitive to 
a specific type of impression management, namely morality. 
Therefore, it should not be interpreted as a general 
propensity for impression management.
While the mean for the morality condition was higher than 
the honesty and control conditions, as predicted, the 
similarity between the honesty and control conditions was 
unexpected. Not only are these means nearly equivalent, but 
they are very close to the means reported by Paulhus (1990) 
for impression management under anonymous conditions (X = 
66.7 and 71.6 for males and females, respectively).
However, in all conditions of this study, subjects handed 
the completed questionnaire directly to the experimenter 
just as they had in Paulhus* public exposure condition. The 
honesty condition was intended to lower impression 
management scores and thus the lower mean is not surprising. 
However, the fact that the control group mean was also as 
low as Paulhus* anonymous groups is rather perplexing. It 
may be that subjects lesser confidence in the control group 
instructions affected scores in this condition. However, 
this argument is not compelling because the pattern of 
results observed in the four-rway interaction in the analysis 
of the question on how much subjects believed the study as 
they were participating in it did not, as would be expected, 
carry over to scores on impression management. That is, if 
subjects* confidence in the instructions was the major
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source of variance in impression management scores, then the 
honesty and control conditions should not have been equal.
The similarity of the results for the honesty and control 
conditions raises an interesting question. If the 
Impression Management Scale is a dilemma as has been argued, 
then why was the honesty mean not lower than the control 
mean? One explanation might be that Paulhus’ anonymous 
condition and the honesty and control conditions in this 
study all represent an absolute baseline for the Impression 
Management Scale. If this were the case, then the honesty 
condition could not result in scores any lower. However, 
such an interpretation fails to account for the control mean 
also being at the level of Paulhus’ anonymous condition.
Another interpretation consistent with the 
conceptualization of the impression management scale as a 
dilemma between honesty and social desirability is that this 
particular sample of subjects tended to value honesty over 
social desirability. If this were the case, the control 
condition mean might be expected to approach the honesty 
condition mean. However, by itself, this interpretation 
also fails to account for the similarity between the honesty 
and control conditions. If this sample was already 
predisposed to honesty (and considering the nature of the 
dilemma present in Paulhus’ scale), solving the dilemma by 
means of honesty in the honest condition would theoretically 
serve to further reinforce honest responding. Thus, the
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honesty condition would lower the impression management 
scores beyond that of the control condition.
It has been argued that neither of the above explanations, 
by themselves, can account for the similarity of the honesty 
and control means. However, if both of the above 
explanations were true, then the subjects predisposition to 
honesty could drive both the honesty and control means to an 
absolute baseline. A test of this baseline hypothesis might 
be to administer the BIDR with the instructions that 
subjects answer it with blatant honesty under anonymous 
conditions. If a mean similar to those presented here was 
obtained, then the similarity of honesty and control scores 
in this study could be attributed to an absolute baseline.
Another interpretation for the similarity between the 
control and honesty conditions is that the socially valued 
impression in this experimental setting was honesty. If the 
subjects perceived the experimenter as one who valued 
honesty over social desirability, then they may have been 
inclined to respond accurately in the control condition 
unless such an impression was contraindicated by other 
experimental variables.
One interpretation from Schlenkerfs (1900) accounting 
procedures is that the value of an impression is not easily 
manipulated in a “risky" direction. In a psychological 
experiment subjects might perceive a moral, socially 
desirable impression as a "safe" impression. To claim an
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honest impression by endorsing less than flattering items, 
even if such is the valued impression, might be perceived as 
a "risky" impression. Since the experimenter-subject 
interaction was shallow and rather brief, the value of 
keeping one's less than perfect self hidden might have been 
greater than the value of gaining the experimenter's 
approval in the honesty condition. In other words, the 
subjects' estimation of the value of any particular 
impression may be more complex than simply that which the 
audience values.
The main effect hypothesis for the Rorschach condition was 
not supported by the results. However, the Rorschach 
condition when combined with the discrepancies condition did 
result in consistently lower scores than the no-Rorschach 
condition (Figure 2). Recall that the Rorschach was 
intended as an alternative to the more elaborate bogus 
pipeline procedure. It appears that the subjects' 
uncertainty about the ability of the Rorschach to accurately 
measure the stated variable of the study probably diminished 
the intended bogus pipeline effect of the instrument. In 
the usual bogus pipeline procedure, great pains are taken to 
convince subjects of the efficacy of the bogus procedure. 
However, these efforts to convince subjects of the efficacy 
of the bogus pipeline procedure should be unnecessary in 
light of Schlenker's accounting procedures. Recall that the 
variable the Rorschach is intended to operationalize in this
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study is the subjects' perceived probability that they could 
successfully claim the valued impression. These results 
suggest that the instructions for the Rorschach had no 
consistent effect on subjects' perceived probability of 
successfully claiming the valued impression. However, it is 
clear from figure 2 that the addition of the Rorschach to 
the morality alone condition decreases the claim of a moral 
impression even when the discrepancies condition is not 
present. Additionally, when combined with the discrepancies 
condition, the Rorschach appears to further reduce 
impression management responding for the form effects stated 
purpose (Figure 2). However, when the Rorschach condition 
was combined with the no discrepancies condition, impression 
management scores increased in the form effects condition. 
This may be due to an effect the Rorschach had on the 
ambiguous nature of the control condition. Subjects in this 
combined Rorschach - no discrepancies condition may have 
been more likely to interpret the form effects instructions 
in a threatening manner, thereby responding with more 
impression management in this condition. Combining the form 
effects - Rorschach condition with the discrepancies rather 
than no discrepancies condition may have served to 
counteract this effect because the discrepancies 
instructions added additional information from which 
subjects could make their interpretation. This opposing 
effect would also serve to mediate a main effect for the
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Rorschach.
Finally, the hypothesized main effect for the 
discrepancies condition was also non-significant. However, 
the interpretation of this lack of support is best described 
in the context of the significant interaction between 
discrepancies and self-monitoring.
The hypothesis concerning self-monitoring predicted an 
interaction between self-monitoring and the stated purpose 
of the study, because theoretically, high self-monitors 
would be more aware of environmental cues and be more 
inclined to respond to them. This hypothesis was not 
supported with respect to the stated purpose of the study. 
However, the significant interaction between self-monitoring 
and discrepancies does suggest differences in impression 
management processes for low and high self-monitors.
This interaction (Figure 3) indicates that the low 
self-monitors scored lower when they were in the 
discrepancies condition than when they were not. In 
contrast, the high self-monitors scored higher when they 
were in the discrepancies condition than when they were not. 
This differential response to the discrepancies condition 
can be interpreted within the framework of this study and 
Paulhus' work. The discrepancies condition may have 
indicated a slight negative sanction for inaccurate 
responding for the low self-monitors resulting in the lower 
mean score for that group. However, for the high
59
self-monitors, the increased public exposure of the 
discrepancies condition may have been salient, resulting in 
the higher mean score. These alternative reactions to the 
discrepancies condition might be an indication of the high 
self-monitors' abilities for impression management as 
compared to the low self-monitors. If the high 
self-monitors were confident about their ability to defend 
their responses, they would be more inclined to give 
socially desirable responses. After all, it would seem to 
be more desirable to talk about socially desirable responses 
if one were not afraid of appearing inconsistent.
The above interpretation is supported by analysis of the 
high self-monitors" data separately. In light of the 
self—monitoring - discrepancies interaction, separate 
analyses for high and low self-monitors were computed using 
the full anova model with all three remaining variables.
The interaction between the stated purpose of the study and 
discrepancies was significant for high self-monitors F(2,60) 
= 5.13, g_<.01 (Figure 4), but not for low self-monitors.
High self-monitors in the honesty - discrepancies condition 
<X = 86.08) scored significantly higher than in the honesty 
- no discrepancies condition (X = 63.5).
This interaction clearly shows that the peculiar reaction 
of the high self-monitors to the discrepancies condition was 
specific to the honesty condition. Such results would 
suggest that the high self-monitors may have been second
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Figure 4. The interaction of stated purpose and 
discrepancies for impression management (high self—monitors 
on1y >.
guessing the study and not actually believing the stated 
purpose. However, inspection of the debriefing 
questionnaire data and free responses do not support this 
interpretation. Low and high self-monitors responded to the 
debriefing questions at the same level.
A1ternatively, if one accepts the assertion that high 
self-monitors are more adept at using impression management 
than low self-monitors, then the honesty - discrepancies 
condition may have become a perfect situation for high self­
£1
monitors to claim a socially desirable image. This would be 
the case if the subjects had confidence in their ability to 
defend their responses and maintain the honest impression. 
High self—monitors would be more likely than low self­
monitors to possess such confidence. Given the above 
conditions, the stated purpose of honesty with a 
"non-threatening" condition of discrepancies sets up a 
wonderful opportunity for high self-monitors to claim an 
“honest" socially desirable impression.
Further support for this interpretation comes f r o m  
inspection of the four-way interaction on the second 
question of the experimental manipulation questionnaire 
(Figure 1). High self-monitors gave their highest ratings 
for how much they believed the study in the honesty - 
discrepancies conditions. This is consistent with previous 
research conducted by Schlenker, Miller, and Leary (1983).
In this study, high self-monitors used more impression 
management when "successful results" were obtained on a test 
which had been described as invalid by the experimenter. In 
the present study, the purpose of the study was described as 
a study in measurement. Recall that the instructions for 
the honesty groups included the statement, "I am trying to 
measure honesty in two different ways." The high 
self-monitors may have been attempting to elevate the 
validity of the tests and their responses to them by giving 
high ratings to how much they believed the stated purpose of
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honesty while completing the questionnaire.
Finally, this interaction between the discrepancies and 
stated purpose conditions for high self-monitors is helpful 
for interpreting the similarity between the means of the
honesty and control conditions. Since high self-monitors
used the honesty - discrepancies condition to claim a 
socially desirable "honest" image, their scores certainly 
had an influence in pulling the honesty condition mean up to
the level of the control condition.
The separate exploratory analysis of the low self-monitors 
showed a different pattern of results. The only significant 
effect for low self-monitors was for the stated purpose of 
the study F.(2,60) = 6.11, g<.01. Similar to the analysis 
for all subjects, the morality condition (X = 95.08) was 
significantly higher than both the honesty (X = 79.50) and 
control (X = 79.83) conditions. These results suggest that 
low self-monitors may have been less sophisticated in their 
use of impression management. They reacted only to the 
stated purpose of the study. Consistent with the definition 
of low self-monitoring, perhaps they were unaware of the 
nuances of the study which influenced the responses of high 
self-monitors.
Self-decept ion
The results of this study support Paulhus* assertion that 
the SD scale does in fact measure self-deception. By 
Paulhus* (1984) reasoning, the lack of significant
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differences across treatment conditions in this study 
suggests that subjects’ responses to the SD scale were 
outside of their awareness. However, the operationalization 
of the stated purpose independent variable was based on the 
IN scale. It is possible that the valued impressions of 
morality and honesty simply did not have an affect on the SD 
scale. Had the valued impression been related to self- 
knowledge, an effect might have been realized. Such 
speculation is offered here only as an alternative 
interpretation and possible direction for future research 
into self-deception.
Total Score
In the interest of generalizing these results to socially 
desirable responding independent of Paulhus’ impression 
management and self-deception factors, the final anova was 
conducted for the total BIDR score. This was Judged useful 
because only 20 percent of the variance in impression 
management and self-deception is shared between the two 
constructs. However, the pattern of results was similar to 
the analysis on impression management. These results 
support the generalization of the findings f r o m  this study 
to the more traditional theories of social desirability.
Item Analysis
The purpose of the item analysis was to explore the 
hypothesis that the experimental conditions had effects at 
the item as well as total scale score level of analysis. It
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was suggested that such effects could operate to mask 
treatment effects in total scale scores if the effects for 
items were in opposing directions.
The results of this analysis failed to support this 
hypothesis for two reasons. First, the number of items 
shown to have significant differences across treatment 
conditions was small, with only one for the IM scale and 
three for the SD scale. Second, the items did not have 
opposing effects. All three items from the SD scale were 
endorsed with more than usual social desirability across 
treatment conditions suggesting that they did not have 
opposing effects on the total SD scale score.
Rorschach
The results from the chi-squared analysis on the quality 
of Rorschach responses produced no compelling evidence that 
any of the experimental conditions had any effect on the 
quality of the responses. However, the pattern of poor 
responses for the stated purpose of the study does suggest 
further investigation of this phenomena. It should be noted 
that the multiple choice version of the Rorschach utilized 
in this investigation is a rather crude usage of the test. 
Putting possible responses into a multiple choice format 
certainly violates the current underlying assumptions of the 
test. In the context of this investigation, the multiple 
choice version may have lacked the sensitivity necessary to 
demonstrate effects for the experimental conditions. In the
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normal free response format, subjects would not have the 
popular responses from which to choose. Thus, this version 
of the Rorschach is a test of the subject's ability to 
recognize and choose the good form responses. The magnitude 
of the quality of response by treatment effect observed in 
this study may have been more pronounced had the test been 
given in its free response format.
Conclusion
The results of this study clearly illustrate that 
impression management is a complex phenomena. As such, the 
assertion that a general tendency for using impression 
management can be measured by a simple self-report 
measurement scale seems doubtful. The measurement scale 
proposed by Paulhus (1990) may not be inappropriate for 
measuring socially desirable impressions which are akin to 
morality. However, the Paulhus scale is probably less 
appropriate for measuring such socially desirable 
impressions as confident, easy-going, friendly, etc. If 
researchers find impression management a useful concept for 
constructing bias-free measurement scales, they will have to 
be aware of the possible types of socially desirable 
impressions their measurement scales may elicit.
The complexity of the impression management process is 
also apparent in the treatment condition interactions of 
this study. Some of these interactions are best interpreted 
as interactions in the operationalizations of the
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independent variables. For instance, subjects* 
interpretation of the stated purpose of the study was almost 
certainly affected by the inclusion of the Rorschach or 
discrepancies conditions. For example, the stated purpose 
of morality may have been interpreted as an honest-like 
morality when combined with the Rorschach and discrepancies 
conditions. These interactions attest to the sensitivity 
subjects had in perceiving the social environment and the 
experimenter's expectations.
Finally, investigation of impression management processes 
is further complicated by consistent differences in 
impression management between low and high self-monitors.
The rather striking results in this study for the high self- 
monitors in the honesty - discrepancies condition suggests 
that self-monitoring should always be a part of discussions 
about impression management. In the present study, the 
hypothesis that self-monitoring would interact with the 
stated purpose of the study was made without an appreciation 
for the impression management abilities of the high self- 
monitors. It seems their abilities go far beyond discerning 
the stated value of some impression. Research about 
impression management which ignores this personality 
dimension may get results dependent on the proportion of 
high to 1 ow self-monitors in the study.
Impression management is a common aspect of most if not 
all social interact ions. It can be particularly menacing to
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psychologists because it threatens the validity of their 
work. Consequently, the ability to either minimize or 
measure impression management is an important area of 
research. This study suggests that 1) the measurement of a 
general propensity for impression management will tend to be 
contaminated by particular impressions, and 2) the 
conditions which will minimize impression management must be 
managed thoughtfully and carefully.
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Appendix A
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR?
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside
each statement to indicate how much you agree with it.
♦ + + + + + +
1--- 2— — 3-----4----5----6---- 7
not true somewhat very true
  1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to
be right.
  2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad
habits.
  3. I don't care to know what other people really think
of me.
  4. I have not always been honest with myself.
  5. I always know why I like things.
  6. I don't know what my major strengths and weaknesses
are.
  7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can
seldom change my opinion.
  8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed
1imi t.
  9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
  10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
  11. I never regret my decisions.
  12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make
up my mind soon enough.
  13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a
di fference.
  14. My parents were not always fair when they punished
me.
  15. I am a completely rational person.
  16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
  17. My solutions to problems are original and
effective.
  18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a sex
partner.
  19. It's alright with me if some people happen to
dislike me.
  20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things
I do.
  21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
  22. I never cover up my mistakes.
  23. There have been occasions when I have taken
advantage of someone.
  24. I never swear.
  25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and
forget.
  26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get
caught.
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27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his
or her back.
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid
1istening.
29. I have received too much change from a salesperson
without telling him or her.
30. I always declare everything at customs.
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
35. I have done things that I don't tell other people
about.
36. I never take things that don't belong to me.
37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even
though I wasn't really sick.
38. I have never damaged a 1ibrary book or store
merchandise without reporting it.
39. I have some pretty awful habits.
40. I don't gossip about other people's business.
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Appendix B
Self Monitoring Scale
Circle true if you agree with the statement as it 
generally applies to yourself. Circle false if you disagree 
with the statement as it generally applies to yourself.
True Pal se 1. I
True Palse 2. At
True False 3. I
True False 4. I
True F al se 5. I
True False 6. I
True False 7. In
True Fal se 8 . In
True False 9. I
True Fal se 10. I'i
True Fal se 11. I <
True False 12. I 1
True False 13. I 1
True Fal se 14. I 1
True False 15. At
True Fal se 16. I
True F alse 17. I (
True False 18. I i
do
no
or
find it hard to imitate the behavior 
of other people.
parties and social gatherings, I 
not attempt to do or say things 
that others will like, 
can only argue for ideas which I 
already believe, 
can impromptu speeches even on 
topics about which I have almost 
informat ion. 
guess I put on a show to impress 
entertain others, 
would probably make a good actor, 
a group of people I am rarely the 
center of attention.
different situations with different 
people, I often act like very 
different persons, 
am not particularly good at making 
other people like me. 
m not always the person I appear to 
be.
would not change my opinions (or the 
way I do things) in order to please 
someone or win their favor, 
have considered being an 
entertainer. 
have never been good at games like 
charades or improvisational acting, 
have trouble changing my behavior to 
suit different people and different 
situat ions.
a party, I let others keep the 
jokes and stories going.
feel a bit awkward in public and do 
not show up quite as well as I 
should.
can look anyone in the eye and tell 
a lie (if for a right end), 
may deceive people by being friendly 
when I really dislike them.
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Append i x C
Rorschach Inkblot Test
You are going to see four inkblot pictures one after 
another. Begin by taking a good look at CARD I and see if 
it, or any part of it reminds you of anything or resembles 
something you have seen. Then read through each of the 
three groups of answers for CARD I. Now underline the one 
answer in Group A, the one answer in Group B, and the one 
answer in Group C, which you think is the best description 
of that inkblot or any of its parts. You, therefore, 
underline three answers for CARD I. When you have done 
this, if you wish, you may put a check beside any other 
answer in any of the three groups which you also feel is a 
good description of the inkblot or any of its parts. Then 
do exactly the same thing for the other cards.
CARD I
A
Underline one answer here.
An army or navy emblem 
crumbling cliffs 
A bat
Nothing at all 
Two people 
A pelvis
An X-ray picture 
Pincers of a crab 
A dirty mess 
Part of my body
B
Underline one answer here.
A headless figure with arms up 
Vertebra
Tiny boxing gloves 
Spilt ink 
Someone's insides 
Nothing at all 
A butterfly flying 
Lava
A coat of arms 
An X-ray of the chest
C
Under1ine one answer here.
A Halloween mask
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Storm clouds 
A moth
Two people on a merry-go-round
A bell in the center
An X-ray picture of the spine
Animal heads on the sides
The stomach
Nothing at all
Eyes glaring at me
CARD II 
A
Underline one answer here.
A bug somebody stepped on
Nothing at all
Two scottie dogs
Little faces on the sides
A bloody spinal column
A white top
A bursting bomb
Two elephants
Two clowns
Red and black ink
B
Underline one answer here.
An animal skin 
Two bears rubbing noses 
Faces of indians on the side 
Blood
Nothing at all 
A white lamp
An exploding firecracker 
A red butterfly 
Two people playing pat-a-cake 
Red and black splotches
C
Underline one answer here.
Two witches
Black and red paint
Bear’s heads
An empty hole
Faces carved in stone
Lungs and blood
A white sting ray
A little temple in the center
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Nothing at ail 
An erupting volcano
CARD VI
A
Underline one answer here.
Two king's heads with crowns
An X-ray picture
Parts of the body
A totem Pole
A fur rug
Mud and water
A polished post
Nothing at all
A turtle
A landslide
B
Underline one answer here.
A dragonfly 
The spinal column 
A cat's whiskers 
Male and female organs 
An animal skin 
Dirty water 
A sceptre 
A snake's head 
Nothing at all 
A spattered mess
C
Underline one answer here. 
A butterfly at the top 
An X-ray of the spine 
Feathers at the top 
A bear skin 
A leaf 
A table leg 
Nothing at all 
Gushing oil 
A little man 
Part of the body
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CARD VIII 
A
Underline one answer here.
An orange or pink butterfly
Shoulders, lungs, and stomach
Nothing at all
Just colors
An emblem
A pretty flower
Heaven and Hel1
Two blue cushions
Two bears climbing
Colored clouds
B
Underline one answer here.
Flowers and leaves 
An X-ray picture 
Colored blobs 
A horseshoe crab 
Nothing at all 
Blue flags 
Two animals climbing 
A colored coat of arms 
Fire and ice 
Parts of my body
C
Underline one answer here.
A Christmas tree 
A medical picture 
Frogs' heads 
Life and Death 
A mountain at the top 
A design for wallpaper 
Inside the mouth
Two beavers walking on colored rocks 
Nothing at all
Colored ink splashed on paper
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Appendix D
Introductory Remarks
Hello, my name is Craig Ravesloot. Are you (Subjects 
name from sign-up sheet)? Good. Please follow me. Did you 
have any trouble finding your way here? (Pause for 
response.) (Enter testing room.) Please have a seat. I am
a graduate student in clinical psychology and I am 
conducting this research for my master's thesis. (Begin 
instructional script for the appropriate experimental 
condit ion.)
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Appendix E
Instructional Script for Each Experimental Condition
1. Morality X Rorschach X Discrepancies Presentation
This is a study about morality. Morality is that 
characteristic of people which influences them to do what is 
right or good in many situations. Many psychologists 
believe that the morality of people in our society is 
deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true because 
their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor 
approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to 
measure morality in two different ways. The first way is 
with a questionnaire which is very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way 
is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. 
This is the test psychologists are using when they ask 
people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. 
It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure 
personality. For instance, psychologists who work with 
prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie 
about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, 
these psychologists get accurate information about the 
inmates.
I will give you the questionnaire about morality first. 
When you are finished with it, I will give you the 
specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After 
you have finished both tests I will compare the results from
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these two test. If their are discrepancies between your 
results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you
about your answers on the questionnaire, so that I can
understand why there are differences between your scores on 
the two different tests.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if 
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
2. Morality X Rorschach X No Discrepancies Presentation.
This is a study about morality. Morality is that 
characteristic of people which influences them to do what is 
right or good in many situations. Many psychologists 
believe that the morality of people in our society is 
deteriorating. But I don’t believe that is true because
their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor
approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to 
measure morality in two different ways. The first way is 
with a questionnaire which is very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way 
is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. 
This is the test psychologists are using when they ask 
people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. 
It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure 
personality. For instance, psychologists who work with 
prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie 
about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach,
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these psychologists get accurate information about the 
inmates.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if 
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
3. Morality X No Rorschach X Discrepancies Presentation
This is a study about morality. Morality is that 
characteristic of people which influences them to do what is 
right or good in many situations. Many psychologists 
believe that the morality of people in our society is 
deteriorating. But I don’t believe that is true because 
their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor 
approach to the measurement of morality. 1 am trying to 
measure morality in two different ways. They are both 
questionnaires which are very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed.
I will give you one of the questionnaires about morality 
first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the 
other. After you have finished both tests I will compare 
the results from these two test. If their are discrepancies 
between your results on these two tests, I would like to 
talk with you about your answers on the questionnaires, so 
that I can understand why there are differences between your 
scores on the two different tests.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if
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you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
4. Morality X No Rorschach X No Discrepancies Presentation. 
This is a study about morality. Morality is that
characteristic of people which influences them to do what is 
right or good in many situations. Many psychologists 
believe that the morality of people in our society is 
deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true because 
their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor 
approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to 
measure morality in two different ways. They are both 
questionnaires which are very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed.
I will give you one of the questionnaires about morality 
first. When you have finished it I will give you the other.
5. Honesty/Truthfulness X Rorschach X Discrepancies 
Presentation.
This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that 
characteristic of people which influences them to be 
truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many 
psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our 
society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true 
because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a 
poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to 
measure honesty in two different ways. The first way is 
with a questionnaire which is very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way
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is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. 
This is the test psychologists are using when they ask 
people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. 
It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure 
personality. For instance, psychologists who work with 
prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie 
about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, 
these psychologists get accurate information about the 
inmates.
I will give you the questionnaire about honesty first.
When you are finished with it, I will give you the 
specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After 
you have finished both tests I will compare the results from 
these two test. If their are discrepancies between your 
results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you 
about your answers on the questionnaire, so that I can 
understand why there are differences between your scores on 
the two different tests.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if 
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
6. Honesty and Truthfulness X Rorschach X No Discrepancies 
Presentation.
This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that 
characteristic of people which influences them to be 
truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many
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psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our 
society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true 
because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a 
poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to 
measure honesty in two different ways. The first way is 
with a questionnaire which is very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way 
is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. 
This is the test psychologists are using when they ask 
people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. 
It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure 
personality. For instance, psychologists who work with 
prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie 
about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, 
these psychologists get accurate information about the 
inmates.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if 
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
7. Honesty and Truthfulness X No Rorschach X Discrepancies 
Presentation.
This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that 
characteristic of people which influences them to be 
truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many 
psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our 
society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true
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because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a 
poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to 
measure honesty in two different ways. They are both 
questionnaires which are very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed.
I will give you one of the questionnaires about honesty 
first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the 
other. After you have finished both tests I will compare 
the results from these two test. If their are discrepancies 
between your results on these two tests, I would like to 
talk with you about your answers on the questionnaires, so 
that I can understand why there are differences between your 
scores on the two different tests.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if 
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
8. Honesty and Truthfulness X No Rorschach X No 
Discrepancies Presentation.
This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that 
characteristic of people which influences them to be 
truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many 
psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our 
society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true 
because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a 
poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to 
measure honesty in two different ways. They are both
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questionnaires which are very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed.
I will give you one of the questionnaires about honesty 
first. When you have finished it I will give you the other.
9. Form Effects in Measurement X Rorschach X Discrepancies 
Present at ion.
This is a study about form effects in psychological 
measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are 
those effects which come from the way psychological 
variables are measured. I am trying to measure 
psychological variables in two different ways. The first 
way is with a questionnaire which is very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way 
is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. 
This is the test psychologists are using when they ask 
people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. 
It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure 
personality. For instance, psychologists who work with 
prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie 
about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, 
these psychologists get accurate information about the 
inmates.
I will give you the questionnaire first. When you are 
finished with it, I will give you the specialized version of 
the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After you have finished both 
tests I will compare the results from these two test. If
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their are discrepancies between your results on these two 
tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on 
the questionnaire, so that I can understand why there are 
differences between your scores on the two different tests.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if 
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
10. Form Effects in Measurement X Rorschach X No 
Discrepancies Presentation.
This is a study about form effects in psychological 
measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are 
those effects which come from the way psychological 
variables are measured. I am trying to measure psychological 
variables in two different ways. The first way is with a 
questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires 
you have probably completed. The other way is with a 
specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is 
the test psychologists are using when they ask people to 
look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is 
used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality.
For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use 
it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are 
really like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists 
get accurate information about the inmates.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if
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you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
11. Form Effects in Measurement X No Rorschach X 
Discrepancies Presentation.
This is a study about form effects in psychological 
measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are 
those effects which come from the way psychological 
variables are measured. I am trying to measure psychological 
variables in two different ways. They are both 
questionnaires which are very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed.
I will give you one of the questionnaires. When you are 
finished with it, I will give you the other. After you have 
finished both tests I will compare the results from these 
two test. If their are discrepancies between your results 
on these two tests, I would like to talk with you about your 
answers on the questionnaires, so that I can understand why 
there are differences between your scores on the two 
different tests.
Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must 
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if 
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
12. Form Effect in Measurement X No Rorschach X No 
Discrepancies Presentation.
This is a study about form effects in psychological 
measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are 
those effects which come from the way psychological
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variables are measured. I am trying to measure psychological 
variables in two different ways. They are both 
questionnaires which are very similar to other 
questionnaires you have probably completed.
I will give you one of the questionnaires first. When you 
have finished it I will give you the other.
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Appendix F
The actual experiment is now complete, however, this 
last set of questions is the most important part of my 
study. I respectfully ask that you answer these questions 
as thoughtfully and accurately as possible. (Circle the 
number which reflects how you felt during the study.)
1. As the study was being explained to you, before you 
filled out the questionnaires, how much did you believe this 
study was about morality?
-4 -3 -2 -1_____ 0  +2 +3 +4
Not at Not very Uncertain Somewhat Completely
all much
2. Before you filled out the questionnaires, if you did not 
believe the study was about morality, what did suspect it 
might be about?
3. As you filled out the paper and pencil questionnaires, 
how much did you believe this study was about morality?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1_____ +2 +3 +4
Not at Not very Uncertain Somewhat Completely
all much
4. As you filled out the questionnaires, if you did not 
believe the study was about morality, what did you suspect 
it might be about?
5. As the study was being explained to you, the 
experimenter stated that he believed the morality of people 
has not declined in recent years. How much did you believe 
him?
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 + 2  + 3  + 4
Not at Not very Uncertain Somewhat Completely
all much
6. If you did not believe the experimenter, what did you 
suspect the experimenter actually believed?
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7. Before you responded to the specialized version of the 
Rorschach Inkblot Test, how accurately did you expect it 
could measure your own level of morality?
^ 4_____ z l_____ z 2_____ zl_____ Q_____ +1_____ +2_____ +3_____ +4
Not at Not very Uncertain Somewhat Very
all accurately accurately accurately
8. Have you ever studied or taken the Rorschach Inkblot 
Test? (Please Circle the appropriate response)
Yes No
If yes, which? Studied Taken
9. How concerned were you about having to discuss 
discrepancies in your test results with the experimenter?
-4 -3 -2_____ -1______0_____ +1_____ +2 +3 4-4
Not at Not very Uncertain Somewhat Very
all concerned concerned concerned
Appendix G
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Debriefing Instructions
Instructions for subjects immediately following the 
experiment
1) Now that you have finished the last questionnaire, I 
would like to tell you some things about my study to help 
you understand why the study was introduced to you the way 
it was, and to help you understand the phenomena I am 
studying.
2) This study is designed to investigate a few of the 
variables which affect the information people disclose about 
themselves to psychologists. The study utilizes theories 
from two fields in psychology: 1) impression management, 
which comes from social psychology, and 2) social 
desirability, which comes from the field of psychometrics or 
the study of psychological measurement techniques.
Basically, these theories are concerned with how people 
present themselves to others.
3) Impression management theories suggests that people 
sometimes behave in ways that are dependent on the image 
they would like people to have of them. For instance, the 
professional wrestlers you may have seen on t.v. probably 
act in different ways than comedians you may have seen. The 
wrestler depends on being seen as aggressive while the
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comedian wants to be seen as funny. In both cases they are 
probably doing things which reflect the way they really are, 
but nonetheless their behaviors are different.
4) Social desirability theories suggest that when 
responding to questionnaires, some people tend to answer in 
ways that are socially acceptable because that’s the way 
many people learn to respond to questionnaires.
5) Dr. Barry Schlenker, a professor at the University of 
Florida, has suggested there are three things which affect 
the tendency of people to act in ways which will develop a 
particular image: 1) the social value of the image, 2) the 
probability that they can successfully claim the image, and 
3) negative sanctions for unsuccessfully claiming an image.
My study is designed to investigate the effect of these 
three variables on responses to the questionnaire you filled 
out. I am introducing this study in different ways and then 
looking at the effect the different introductions have on 
the questionnaire responses. However, I am only looking at 
differences among the different groups of people who hear 
the same instructions. Therefore, my results will only be 
reported in terms of group differences. In order to 
introduce this study in different ways, I had to tell you 
some things which were untrue.
6) I told you that many psychologists believe the moral 
integrity (honesty) of people in our society has declined in 
recent years. I don’t really know what psychologists believe
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about the moral integrity (honesty) of people in our 
society. I told you that so that you would believe the 
study was about moral integrity (honesty). My instructions 
to another group of subjects indicate that this study is 
about honesty and a final group is hearing that the study is 
about form effects in psychological measurement. By 
introducing the study in different ways, I am hoping to 
increase the value of a particular image, e.g. moral 
integrity, honesty, none. Perhaps you can imagine how 
differing instructions might have different effects on how 
one answers the questionnaire you filled out?
7) I also told you that you would be taking a specialized 
version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test that could also 
measure moral integrity (honesty). The multiple choice 
version of the Rorschach you completed was an actual version 
of the Rorschach which was introduced in 1943. However, 
this version really has no validity in measuring moral 
integrity (honesty). This version of the Rorschach is no 
longer used very much today because most psychologists 
believe the multiple choice format invalidates the test. 
Also, in the instructions of my study, I indicated that the 
Rorschach is often used by psychologists to detect lying. 
While it is true that it is much more difficult to 
dissimulate responses to the Rorschach than other tests, 
that is not the main reason psychologists use it. It is a 
very common personality test which when used correctly can
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be very useful in helping the people with whom psychologists 
work. I included the Rorschach in my instructions because I 
wanted you to believe I had a way of getting at the truth.
1 am only telling half the subjects about the Rorschach.
The other half I am telling I have 2 different paper and 
pencil tests for measuring moral integrity (honesty). Again 
you may be able to see how telling an individual that there 
responses can be cross-checked for accuracy may change their 
approach to the test.
8) Finally, 1 told you that when you were finished with 
both tests I would be comparing your answers from each test 
so that I could talk with you about any discrepancies. 1 
told you that because I wanted you to feel a need to answer 
honestly. However, I am not really interested in 
consistency. I wanted you to believe that if you did not 
respond accurately you would have to face up to 
inconsistencies. Some subjects are not being told that I 
will compare the results of the two tests. Once more 
perhaps you can see how people might approach the tests 
differently, depending on whether they will be questioned 
about their responses or not?
9) The questionnaire you filled out is the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding. It was constructed by 
Dr. Leroy Paulhus, a professor at the University of British 
Columbia. It is designed to measure inaccuracies in self- 
report. Thus, my study involves giving subjects different
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instructions and then looking for group differences in the 
BIDR scores depending on the instructions the individuals 
heard. Do you have any questions or comments about the 
study?
10) Finally, I have one last thing I need to say. The 
results from this experiment may make an important 
contribution to our knowledge of how people present 
themselves to others under different circumstances. 
Additionally, I have spent more than a year putting this 
thesis study together and it really represents an important 
milestone in my career. However, I need your cooperation on 
with one other thing if this study is going to produce 
accurate data. Since this study includes deception, I 
respectfully ask that you do not discuss with anyone the 
nature of my study. All my hard work will be lost if the 
nature of my study becomes common knowledge in the subject 
pool. Will you keep your experiences here today to 
yourself?
11) Thank very much for your participation today. If you 
would like to see the results from this study, please put 
your name and summer address on the sign-up sheet and I will 
send you a copy of the report.
Instructions for subjects who withdraw from the study
I want to thank you for coming today. I understand and 
respect that sometimes research subjects are not comfortable
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with the experiment as they learn more about what will be 
required of them. You will receive full credit for coming 
today.
I would like to tell you a little bit about the study to 
help you understand why I explained it to you the way I did.
This study is designed to investigate a few of the 
variables which affect the information people disclose about 
themselves to psychologists. The study utilizes theories 
from two fields in psychology: 1) impression management, 
which comes from social psychology, and 2) social 
desirability, which comes from the field of psychometrics or 
the study of psychological measurement techniques.
Basically, these theories are concerned with how people 
present themselves to others.
Impression management theories suggests that people 
sometimes behave in ways that are dependent on the image 
they would like people to have of them. For instance, the 
professional wrestlers you may have seen on t.v. probably 
act in different ways than comedians you may have seen. The 
wrestler depends on being seen as aggressive while the 
comedian wants to be seen as funny. In both cases they are 
probably doing things which reflect the way they really are, 
but nonetheless their behaviors are different.
Social desirability theories suggest that when responding 
to questionnaires, some people tend to answer in ways that 
are socially acceptable because that's the way many people
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learn to respond to questionnaires.
Dr. Barry Schlenker, a professor at the University of 
Florida, has suggested there are three things which affect 
the tendency of people to act in ways which will develop a 
particular image: 1) the social value of the image, 2) the
probability that they can successfully claim the image, and
3) negative sanctions for unsuccessfully claiming an image.
My study is designed to investigate the effect of these 
three variables on responses to the questionnaire you would 
have filled out. I am introducing this study in different 
ways and then looking at the effect the different 
introductions have on the questionnaire responses. However, 
I am only looking at differences among the different groups 
of people who hear the same instructions. Therefore, my 
results will only be reported in terms of group differences. 
In order to introduce this study in different ways, I had to 
tell you some things which were untrue. I told you that 
many psychologists believe the moral integrity (honesty) of 
people in our society has declined in recent years. I don't 
really know what psychologists believe about the moral 
integrity (honesty) of people in our society. I told you 
that so that you would believe the study was about moral 
integrity (honesty). My instructions to another group of 
subjects indicate that this study is about honesty and a 
final group is hearing that the study is about form effects 
in psychological measurement. By introducing the study in
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different ways, I am hoping to increase the value of a 
particular image, e.g. moral integrity, honesty, control. 
Perhaps you can imagine how differing instructions might 
have different effects on how one answers the questionnaire 
you filled out?
I also told you that when you were finished with both 
tests I would be comparing your answers from each test so 
that I could talk with you about any discrepancies. I told 
you that because I wanted you to feel a need to answer 
honestly. However, I am not really interested in 
consistency. I wanted you to believe that if you did not 
respond accurately you would have to face up to 
inconsistencies. Some subjects are not being told that I 
will compare the results of the two tests. Again, perhaps 
you can see how people might approach the tests differently, 
depending on whether they will be questioned about their 
responses or not?
The questionnaire you would have filled out is the 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. It was 
constructed by Dr. Leroy Paulhus, a professor at the 
University of British Columbia. It is designed to measure 
inaccuracies in self-report. Thus, my study involves giving 
subjects different instructions and then looking for group 
differences in the BIDR scores depending on the instructions 
the individuals heard. Do you have any questions or 
comments about the study?
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Finally, I have one last thing I need to say. The results 
from this experiment may make an important contribution to 
our knowledge of how people present themselves to others 
under different circumstances. Additionally, I have spent 
more than a year putting this thesis study together and it 
really represents an important milestone in my career. 
However, I need your cooperation on with one other thing if 
this study is going to produce accurate data. Since this 
study includes deception, I respectfully ask that you do not 
discuss with anyone the nature of my study. All my hard 
work will be lost if the nature of my study becomes common 
knowledge in the subject pool. Will you keep your 
experiences here today to yourself?
Thank you very much for your participation today. If you 
would like to see the results from this study, please put 
your name and summer address on the sign-up sheet and I will 
send you a copy of the report.
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Appendix H
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding for Social 
Desirability Scale Value Rating
Directions: Below are 40 statements which might be used in
describing another person. Please rate each of the 40 
statements as to how socially desirable or socially 
undesirable you consider it to be when used to describe 
other people. We are not interested in whether the 
statement does or does not describe you. Just rate it 
according to how socially desirable or undesirable you 
consider it to be if applied to other people in general.
Use the rating scale shown below in making your ratings.
Rat ina Meaning of Rating
1 Extremely Undesirable
2 Strongly Undesirable
3 Moderately Undesirable
4 Mildly Undesirable
5 NEUTRAL
6 Mildly Desirable
7 Moderately Desirable
8 Strongly Desirable
9 Extremely Desirable
Your task is to read and rate the social desirability 
of each of the statements in the test booklet using the 
rating scale shown above. Remember that you are to Judge 
the statements in terms of whether you consider them to be 
socially desirable or undesirable when applied to other 
people. We are not interested in whether a statement does 
or does not describe you. Be sure to make a Judgement about 
each statement.
  1. His first impressions of people usually turn out to
be right.
  2. It would be hard for him to break any of his bad
hab its.
  3. He doesn't care to know what other people really
think of him.
  4. He has not always been honest with himself.
  5. He always knows why he likes things.
  6. He doesn't know what his major strengths and
weaknesses are.
  7. Once he's made up his mind, other people can
seldom change his opinion.
  8. He is not a safe driver when he exceeds the speed
1imit.
  9. He is fully in control of his own fate.
  10. It's hard for him to shut off a disturbing thought.
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11. He never regrets his decisions.
12. He sometimes loses out on things because he can’t
make up his mind soon enough.
13. The reason he votes is because he believes his vote
can make a difference.
14. He believes his parents were not always fair when
they punished him.
15. He is a completely rational person.
16. He rarely appreciate criticism.
17. His solutions to problems are original and
ef feet ive.
18. He has sometimes doubted his ability as a sex
partner.
19. It’s alright with him if some people happen to
dislike him.
20. He doesn’t always know the reasons why he does the
things he does.
21. He sometimes tell lies if he has to.
22. He never cover up his mistakes.
23. There have been occasions when he has taken
advantage of someone.
24. He never swears.
25. He sometimes tries to get even rather than forgive
and forget.
26. He always obey laws, even if he’s unlikely to get
caught.
27. He has said something bad about a friend behind his
or her bac k.
28. When he hears people talking privately, he avoids
listening.
29. He has received too much change from a salesperson
without telling him or her.
30. He always declares everything at customs.
31. When he was young he sometimes stole things.
32. He has never dropped litter on the street.
33. He sometimes drives faster than the speed limit.
34. He never reads sexy books or magazines.
35. He has done things that he doesn’t tell other
people about.
36. He never takes things that don’t belong to him.
37. He has taken sick-leave from work or school even
though he wasn’t really sick.
38. He has never damaged a 1ibrary book or store
merchandise without reporting it.
39. He has some pretty awful habits.
40. He doesn’t gossip about other people’s business.
